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Abstract 
Dual process models of cognition suggest there are two kinds of thought: rapid, automatic Type 1 
processes, and effortful, controlled Type 2 processes. Models of creative thinking also 
distinguish between two sets of processes: those involved in the generation of ideas, and those 
involved with their refinement, evaluation and/or selection. Here we review dual process models 
in both these literatures and delineate the similarities and differences. Both generative and 
evaluative creative processing modes involve elements that have been attributed to each of the 
dual processes of cognition. We explore the notion that creative thinking may rest upon the 
nature of a shifting process between generative and evaluative modes of thought. We suggest 
that through a synthesis application of the evidence bases on dual process models of cognition 
and from neuroimaging, together with developing chronometric approaches to explore the 
shifting process, could assist the development of interventions to facilitate creativity. 
 
 
Keywords: creativity, dual process model, associative thought, analytic thought, Type 1 and 
Type 2 thinking 
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Dual Process Models of Cognition 
The notion that there are different types of thought processes extends at least back to the 
Ancient Greeks who distinguished between intellectual intuition and knowledge received by the 
senses. The nature of intuition and the distinction between sensory knowledge and reasoning also 
preoccupied later philosophers such as Descartes, Locke, Kant, Bergeson, and Russell for 
centuries (see Frankish, 2010). In the last decade, Cognitive Psychology has provided increasing 
evidence of two kinds of thinking processes and has made significant progress towards 
understanding their nature and operation (Evans, 2008; Frankish, 2010). One kind of process, 
often grouped as ‘System 1’ are characterised as rapid, unconscious, automatic, and associative 
in nature, corresponding to our gut reactions and intuitions. This system is seen as high capacity, 
able to rapidly combine (or associate) information that has been implicitly stored in memory, 
over long time periods, with sensory information from the current context without effortful 
thinking and intervention; that is, it is reflexive. The other set of processes are often grouped as 
‘System 2’. These involve thinking that is characterised as slow, controlled, effortful, conscious, 
and analytic, and that is limited by the capacity of working memory. Thinking using these 
processes is seen as rule based, applying these rules explicitly to current information; that is, it is 
reflective. Whereas System 1 processes are thought to be unrelated to intellectual ability, System 
2 processes are thought to be correlated with intelligence. In some views, those with higher 
cognitive ability tend to be better able to apply System 2 thinking to intervene with belief based 
conclusions drawn from System 1 (Stanovich, 1999).  
However, the simplicity of the distinction between these two systems drawn here belies 
the diversity and complexity of research in this area, and it is clear that the two systems account 
needs to be elaborated and revised. For instance, Evans (2008) notes that the evidence does not 
support the idea of just two separate systems, and he argues that we should stick with the terms 
Type 1 & 2 processes. He points out that there are different, incompatible variants of System 1, 
with those focusing on heuristic thinking quite different from those focused on associative 
thinking. Further, he notes that there are multiple forms of implicit processing that may be 
involved in ‘System 1’, some of which act autonomously to directly influence behaviour, and 
some of which supply pre-attentive information to working memory for analytic System 2 
processes to use to control behaviour. In a related vein, Stanovich (2004) proposes The 
Autonomous Set of Systems (TASS), which have in common their fast, automatic, unconscious 
nature, but that differ in their diverse foci, which include emotional regulation of behaviour, 
unconscious implicit learning, and decision making principles that have become automatic 
through practice. Finally, in agreement with the view that System 1 might be better considered in 
terms of the set of underlying processes, Glöckner and Witteman (2010) proposed that intuition, 
a key feature of ‘System 1’, can in fact be broken down into four distinct kinds of automatic 
process. In sum, the evidence suggests that the notion of a unitary System 1 is not tenable. 
A further issue is how the two types of processes interact. According to what Evans 
(2008) terms a “default interventionist” theory, Type 1 processes provide fast, preconscious 
information to working memory that is used to guide behaviour by default, unless analytic 
reasoning intervenes (e.g. Evans, 2006; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). According to what Evans 
terms a “parallel-competitive” theory, implicit knowledge from Type 1 processes and explicit 
knowledge from Type 2 processes compete to control behaviour (e.g., Sloman, 1996; Smith & 
DeCoster, 2000). It has also been suggested that a third process controls the shift between Type 1 
and Type 2 thinking (Stanovich, 2009). Use of the two systems may vary as a function of 
disposition such that some individuals are more inclined to use Type 1 processes and others Type 
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2 processes (e.g., Epstein, 2003; Stanovich, 1999). We contend that the nature of the interaction 
between the systems may be a key source of individual differences in creative thinking ability 
and of variation in creative thinking across time by a given individual. Before we can consider 
how this interaction might influence creative thinking it is necessary to consider the relationship 
between dual process models of cognition in general and dual process models of creativity more 
specifically.  
 
Dual Processes in Creative Thinking 
Contemporary definitions of creativity vary considerably. Kaufman and Sternberg (2010, 
p. xiii) focus on the creative outcome and suggest that a creative response must be “novel, good, 
and relevant”. Some add that creative responses should also be surprising (Boden, 2004; 
Simonton, 2012). Other definitions of creativity put less focus on the creative outcome. Plucker, 
Beghetto, and Dow (2004) suggest that “creativity is the interaction among aptitude, process and 
environment by which an individual or group produces a perceptible product that is both novel 
and useful as defined within a social context”. Thus, their definition acknowledges that creativity 
arises in response to a confluence of factors both within and external to the individual 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). Gabora (2010a) puts even more emphasis internal rather than external 
change, claiming that a cognitive process is viewed as creative to the extent that it transforms 
how the individual makes sense of or interacts with the world: “The end result is that one’s 
internal web of understandings is forged in a unique way, which is in turn reflected in its 
creative output” (Gabora. 2010a). Despite these varying views, most contemporary researchers 
agree that creative outcomes must be both original and of value within a given domain. We use 
the term ‘value’ here because we believe it is more domain neutral than other terms used to 
encapsulate the quality aspect of creative responses, such as ‘useful’ or ‘relevant’, that may be 
inappropriate for domains such as the fine arts.  
The assumption underlying several measures of creativity appears to be that creativity is 
the product of a single type of process, divergent thinking (e.g. the Alternate Uses Test and the 
Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking). However, creativity can also benefit from convergent 
thinking (Dietrich, 2007; Gabora, 2000, 2003), and evaluation (e.g. Silvia, 2008). A attempt to 
locate creativity in just one type of thinking process comes from research within the framework 
of Epstein (2003) proposed a Cognitive-Experiential Self Theory (CEST) of personality in which 
there are two information-processing systems: an experiential system that can be mapped onto 
Type 1 processes, and a rational system that can be mapped onto Type 2 processes. Epstein 
suggested that creativity is a product of the experiential system because, as an associative 
system, it can suggest ideas that would not be available to the linear-processing rational system. 
Indeed an experiential thinking style was found to be positively correlated with performance on 
divergent thinking tests (Norris & Epstein, 2011). However,  these tests focus on fluency—how 
many creative ideas are generated—whilst neglecting comparative evaluation of the responses, 
nor do they require the kind of sustained critical creative thinking that is required by most real-
world creative tasks.  
  The majority of other models of creative thinking tend to have in common an emphasis 
on the dual processes of developing ideas and evaluating them. The generic definition of a 
creative outcome implies these different processes, with generative processes required to 
formulate original ideas and evaluation processes required to select and/or refine those ideas into 
a form that is of value (see also Howard-Jones & Murray, 2003). We next review key models 
starting with the work of Guilford (1950, 1956), and examine their relationship to each other and 
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to more general dual process models of cognition. We will see that while dual process models of 
creativity frequently appeal to the language of dual process models of cognition (e.g. Gabora & 
Aerts, 2009; Howard-Jones & Murray, 2003; Kaufman, 2011) they cannot always be 
straightforwardly mapped onto the dual processes espoused in models of cognition.  
In his Structure of Intellect Model, Guilford (1956) distinguished between divergent and 
convergent thinking processes and the operation of these two processes can be viewed as an 
initial, contemporary dual process model of creative thinking. As mentioned above, divergent 
processes are traditionally thought to involve generating many different possible ideas, whereas 
convergent processes home in on a single solution. Several authors have suggested that divergent 
processes are associative in character, such that items encoded in memory are combined with 
information from the current context in a state of defocused attention (Gabora, 2010a; 
Martindale, 1999). Conversely, convergent processes are seen as analytic in character, and 
thought to predominate in the refinement and evaluating of solutions . Thus, in some respects 
divergent and convergent thinking appear to map neatly onto ideas about Type 1 and Type 2 
processes. However, there are important differences. For instance, although divergent thinking 
may be spontaneous and associative in nature, with solutions sometimes appearing in a flash of 
insight, it can also be effortful and deliberate (e.g., Ward, 1994) and in this sense have more in 
common with Type 2 than Type 1 processes (Frankish, 2010). Furthermore, experiencing a flash 
of insight indicates convergence on an idea or solution but this may arrive at the end of an 
unconscious process (see ideas about incubation, Wallas, 1926) implying that convergent 
thinking can be unconscious and arise from Type 1 as well as Type 2 processes. Thus, a simple 
mapping of divergent thinking onto Type 1 and convergent thinking onto Type 2 processes is not 
possible. 
Basadur et al. (1982; see also Basadur, 1995) propose the notion of ideation-evaluation 
cycles. They distinguish between three major stages in the creative thinking process — problem 
finding, problem solving, and solution implementation — and suggest that ideation and 
evaluation are involved at each stage in varying degree according to the domain. For instance, 
domains that emphasise problem finding have a high ratio of ideation to evaluation, whereas 
domains that emphasise solution implementation show the converse. They propose that 
dispositional differences in the tendency to ideate vs. evaluate lead to differences in the domain 
best suited to an individual.  
 An early dual process account of creativity is the Darwinian theory of creativity,  
sometimes referred to as BVSR for “Blind Variation and Selective Retention” (Campbell 1960; 
Simonton, 1999, 2007, 2010, 2012). It proposes we generate new ideas through an essentially a 
trial-and-error process involving ‘blind’ generation of ideational variants followed by selective 
retention of the fittest variants for development into a final product. The variants are referred to 
as ‘blind’ because the creator has no subjective certainty about whether they are a step in the 
direction of the final creative result.  
There is an intuitive appeal to BVSR; as do biological species, creative ideas exhibit the 
kind of complexity and adaptation over time that is indicative of an evolutionary process, both 
when they are expressed to others, and in the mind of a single creator (Gabora, 1997; Terrell, 
Hunt & Gosden, 1997; Thagard, 1980; Tomasello 1996). Although it is outside the scope of this 
paper to discuss them in detail, numerous problems have been identified with BVSR as a 
conceptual framework for creativity (Dasgupta, 2004; Eysenck, 1995; Gabora, 2005, 2007, 
2010b, 2011; Sternberg, 1998; Weisberg, 2004). Nevertheless it seems reasonable that in 
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creativity, as in natural selection, there is a process conducive to generating variety, and another 
conducive to pruning out inferior variants. 
An assumption in BVSR is that successively generated ideas are unrelated. This is not supported 
by empirical studies of creativity (Feinstein, 2006; Nijstad & Stroebe, 2006). A dual process 
theory of creativity that is consistent with these findings is Finke, Ward and Smith’s (1992) 
Genoplore model, which divides creative thinking into two overarching stages of idea generation 
and exploration. These are further subdivided into smaller stages with multiple operations 
available at each stage. For instance, generation can involve retrieval of items from memory, 
formation of associations between items, and synthesis and transformation of the resultant ‘pre-
inventive’ structures. Exploration can involve identifying the attributes of these pre-inventive 
structures and considering their potential function in different contexts. Evidence for this model 
comes from findings that when people generate ideas they appear to make use of exemplars from 
the same or a related domain and they endow the new idea with many of the attributes of the 
previous exemplar. For instance, when asked to imagine an alien creature that lives on a planet 
very different from earth people typically include features of animals on earth such as arms 
and/or legs (Ward, 1994) Ward refers to this process as the path of least resistance (see also 
Ward & Kolomyts, 2010). 
The Genoplore model can be partially mapped onto dual process models of cognition, 
with the generative phase corresponding to Type 1 thinking and the exploration of pre-inventive 
structures corresponding to Type 2 thinking. However, analytic processes may give rise to new 
ideas and insights (Finke, 1996). Thus, the generation phase appears to involve both Type 1 and 
2 processes whereas the exploration phase is consistent with Type 2 processes alone.  
The ‘Honing Theory’ of creativity (Gabora, 2005, in prep.) also posits that people draw 
on past knowledge when generating new possibilities, expanding on Mednick’s (1962) work on 
flat associative hierarchies. Mednick found that whereas most people have rather steep 
associative hierarchies (i.e., a given stimulus evokes only highly related items in memory), 
creative people have flat associative hierarchies (i.e., a given stimulus evokes not just highly 
related but also remotely related items). Gabora proposes that creative people spontaneously 
enter a state of flattened associative hierarchies during idea generation (Gabora 2010a; see also 
Martindale, 1995), and that refinement of an idea occurs through iterative interaction between 
the current conception of the idea and the individual’s internal model of the world, or 
‘worldview’. Creativity then arises through the joint effects of associative and analytic modes of 
thought and the process of shifting between them in response to task demands (for related views 
see also Howard-Jones, 2002; Martindale, 1999; Vartanian, Martindale & Kwiatkowski, 2007). 
In this view, the activation of flattened associative hierarchies, when presented with a task 
requiring a creative response, facilitates the forging of connections between more remote 
attributes of ideas and concepts in a contextually bound way that contrasts with the BVSR view 
that creative generation is independent of context. The latter view is necessary for BVSR 
because if generated ideas were influenced by context then they would likely be related to that 
context, and therefore to each other, and therefore not blind. The ideas that result from the 
associative process described by Gabora are then honed by an analytic process characterised by 
‘spiky’ neural activation functions. Thinking becomes more focused on core aspects of the idea 
and can involve logically testing and elaborating the idea into a final solution.  
 Gabora’s theory of creativity addresses criticisms of BVSR by accounting for observed 
effects of context and expertise on creative thinking (e.g., Howard-Jones & Murray, 2003; 
Vincent, Decker & Mumford, 2002) and gets us closer to an understanding of the fundamental 
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mechanisms underlying creative thought, but there are still aspects to work out. The theory 
emphasises the importance of the ability to shift from an analytic to an associative mode of 
thought when stuck in a rut, and from an associative to an analytic mode following insight, and 
computer models have shown this shifting to be effective (DiPaola & Gabora, 2007, 2009; 
Gabora, Chia & Firouzi, 2013; Gabora & DiPaola, 2012). However, there has been little 
empirical investigation of this shifting in humans. Thus, when analysed in relation to dual 
process models of cognition, it is not yet clear whether a straightforward mapping can be made. 
Whilst associative and analytic thinking processes appear to be closely related to Type 1 
and 2 thinking, their recruitment may be different. In dual process models of cognition, Type 1 
processes either govern behaviour by default or in competition with Type 2 processes. However, 
the nature of the relationship between these types of process in creative thinking may be 
different. For example, creative thinking may be characterised by shifting from analytic to 
associative thinking as suggested in Howard-Jones (2002) Dual-State model of creative 
cognition. Howard-Jones suggests that a key barrier to creativity is the notion of ‘fixation’, and 
proposes strategies to help shift individuals from secondary process, analytical thinking to 
primary process associative thinking. At present, Gabora’s theory is uncommitted to where on 
the spectrum from associative to analytic the ‘default’ starting point falls when thinking 
creatively and acknowledges the possibility that the default point may vary across individuals 
(see also Basadur et al. 1982; Basadur, 1995; Epstein, 2003; Stanovich, 1999). It seems likely 
that work on dual process models of cognition could usefully contribute to exploring the process 
of shifting between Type 1 and 2 thinking processes in the context of creative thinking. 
 Another recent dual process theory of creative thinking, proposed by Nijstad, De Dreu, 
Rietzschel and Baas (2010), suggests that creativity can arise through two pathways: a flexibility 
pathway and a persistence pathway. Greater cognitive flexibility is viewed as generating more 
categories of ideas, and as more frequent shifting between them, which Nijstad et al. argue can 
lead to greater originality. Thus, the flexibility pathway appears to relate to dual-process models 
of creativity, such as BVSR, that have suggested that multiple idea variants are generated. 
However, they argue that exploring a few content categories in depth may also lead to increased 
originality. Given its focus on a few categories of idea, the persistence pathway appears to relate 
to other models of creativity that focus on developing ideas, such as Honing Theory. However, 
the flexibility and persistence model is different from these previous models in that it strongly 
emphasises deliberative processing under conscious executive control. Indeed Nijstad et al. (p43) 
state “our model is not applicable to situations in which creativity occurs ‘‘spontaneously’’ 
without intentional effort”. In essence, they argue that the creative thinking described by their 
model is primarily a product of Type 2 processes. However, they note that the degree of 
executive control differs between their two pathways. The flexibility pathway uses broad and 
inclusive cognitive categories, flexibly shift among categories, approaches, and sets, and 
establish more remote associations. The authors suggest that, in the case of individuals with high 
mental ability, this may be helped by reduced latent inhibition, which allows more distant 
associates and ideas to enter working memory. Such individuals may have the necessary 
cognitive control to benefit from reduced inhibition because they are also able to evaluate and 
identify the inevitable proportion of poor solutions that result if more are allowed. The 
persistence pathway achieves creative outcomes through a systematic and effortful exploration of 
possibilities and an in depth exploration of only a few categories or perspectives. These 
systematic processes are likely to start with readily available solutions. Less obvious, more 
original, solutions only arrive if the individual persists in generating more ideas within a 
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category. Because systematic search is involved in this pathway they argue that higher levels of 
executive control are required than for the flexibility pathway. When persisting, individuals will 
be less distractible, but also less flexible because more distant associates are filtered out. 
Nijstad et al. note that because the persistence pathway reduces flexibility it might appear 
to be negatively related to the flexibility pathway. However, they argue that this is not the case 
because individuals can shift from a flexible mode, where they discover new and promising 
approaches to a task, to a systematic, persistent mode where they further explore these 
approaches. In describing this shifting process the distinction from previous ‘generate and 
explore’ models is somewhat lost. It again appears that creativity may most likely result from the 
joint operation of both pathways such that the flexibility pathway helps with the development of 
originality and the persistence pathway with the elaboration of ideas into those that will prove 
useful. As such the pathways might not appear conceptually to be independent ‘dual-routes’ but 
necessarily coupled stages in a creative thinking process, much as proposed in other work. 
However, arguing against this, Nijstad et al (pers. com.) find that the correlation between their 
measure of flexibility – the number of categories generated – and their measure of persistence - 
the within category fluency (average number of ideas per category/total number of ideas 
generated) – decreases over time. This might suggest that on a given task, rather than shifting 
between pathways individuals become increasingly entrenched in the processing associated with 
one pathway over time. 
Nijstad et al. provide a meta-analysis of the relationship between their measures of 
flexibility and persistence on the originality and feasibility of creative ideas. They find a 
correlation of 0.36 between flexibility and originality that is much stronger than the correlation 
of 0.12 between within-category-fluency (persistence) and originality. This suggests that the 
flexibility pathway is more strongly implicated in the overall originality of ideas, although 
Nijstad et al cite evidence that the relationship between within-category-fluency and originality 
increases for the originality of ideas within a particular category (Rietzschel, 2005; Rietzschel, 
Nijstad & Stroebe, 2007). This latter finding somewhat strengthens the argument that persistence 
can indeed increase originality, but still overall originality is much more strongly related to 
flexibility than to persistence. In addition, Nijstad et al find no factors that significantly correlate 
with feasibility of ideas other than originality, which is negatively correlated. This, coupled with 
a greater emphasis on measures of originality, leaves somewhat unaddressed in their model the 
question of how creative ideas that are both original and of value come about. One possibility 
arises from examination of the effects of mood state on creativity. De Dreu et al (2008) find that 
negative activating mood states enhance persistence, which they argue should benefit within 
category fluency. However, another possibility is that negative activating mood states also 
improve the evaluation of creative ideas as observed by Sowden & Dawson (2011) thereby 
enhancing their value. 
In summary, Nijstad et al provide strong evidence for a flexibility pathway that promotes 
creativity through increasing the originality of ideas, but the evidence for the impact of a second 
persistence pathway on originality is weaker, nor does persistence relate to the feasibility (value) 
of ideas. The factors predicting the latter are largely unexplained by their model. Thus again, 
whilst dual process models of cognition clearly relate to Nijstad et al’s ideas, the mapping is not 
straightforward. There appears to be a clear relationship between Type 1 processes and the 
flexibility pathway in that both are associative in character, but the flexibility pathway requires 
deliberative processing to evaluate ideas (“an idea monitor”) and keep them on track, sometimes 
viewed as a function of Type 2 processing. Further, although both Type 2 processes and the 
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persistence pathway are hypothesised to make strong use of working memory, the persistence 
pathway does not appear to contribute to the feasibility of creative ideas whereas a key function 
of Type 2 processes is evaluation. 
In summary, we have looked at two sets of dual process models: general cognitive 
models and models of creative thinking. Table 1 summarizes the various elements of these 
models and the relationships between them. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
It is clear that both idea generation and evaluation may recruit Type 1 and 2 processes, 
and this might suggest the possibility of a four-component model of creative thinking. Although 
this cannot be ruled out, some recent models of creative thinking do align quite parsimoniously 
with Dual Process models of cognition, particularly Howard Jones’ Dual State model (2002) and 
Gabora’s Honing Theory (2005, in prep.). Nevertheless, the question of how Type 1 and 2 
processes interact in creative thinking remains largely unanswered. Although there is general 
agreement that shifting between the different modes is required for creative ideas to develop (e.g. 
Basadur, 1982; Basadur et al., 1985; Finke et al., 1992; Gabora & Ranjan, 2013; Howard-Jones 
2002; Nijstad et al., 2010), it is not known whether this is different when thinking creatively, 
how it varies across individuals, and whether it could be trained. These issues are addressed in 
the next sections. 
Mechanisms of shifting between modes of creative thought 
Dual-process models of creative thinking make different predictions concerning the 
extent to which the modes operate in series or in parallel. The dual-stage models of Basadur 
(1995), Howard-Jones (2002), Finke et al. (1992) and the theory of the emergence of a creative 
insight proposed by Gabora and Ranjan (2013) suggest shifting between modes of thinking 
occurs in series. However, Nijstad et al’s (2010) dual-pathway model suggests that an ‘idea 
monitor’, a mechanism that evaluates ideas, continually checks the outputs of idea generation 
processes in a similar fashion to type 2 processes in default-interventionist dual-process accounts 
of cognition (Evans, 2008; Frankish, 2010). This suggests that individuals have the mode of 
thinking supporting evaluation available ‘‘on tap’ and can apply it to keep idea generation in 
check. While not necessarily implying that the two modes ] operate in parallel, Nijstad et al.’s 
(2010) model does suggest that generation and evaluation work more in unison than in the 
aforementioned serial models. Serial models can be interpreted as implying that it is necessary to 
disengage one mode prior to engaging the other mode, or shift along the continuum between 
analytic to associative thinking (Gabora & Ranjan, 2013). If shifting does occur in a serial 
fashion then attempts to stimulate it could focus on improving the individual’s ability or 
tendency to engage the optimal mode of thinking for performance in a particular phase of the 
creative process. On the other hand if generation and evaluation occur in a more parallel fashion 
then it may be best to improve an individual’s evaluative ability and ensure that evaluative 
processes are quickly accessible ‘on tap’ alongside associative processes. It could be that both 
parallel and serial accounts are correct but there are individual differences in the shifting 
mechanism. For example, creative individuals may have evaluative processes ‘on tap’ while less 
creative individuals may shift more slowly between different modes in a serial fashion. 
Different models also propose different mechanisms that enable shifting between modes 
of thinking. Nijstad et al. (2010) propose that executive control underlies thinking within both 
pathways but lower cognitive control is applied in the flexibility pathway when broadening one’s 
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attention, while higher cognitive control is applied in the persistence pathway to support 
systematic search. With different pathways conceptualised as engaging different levels of 
cognitive control, a means of stimulating shifting between them may take the form of stimulating 
a person’s ability to flexibly modulate cognitive control in response to the phase of the creative 
process. There is some evidence that creative people are better able to flexibly modulate 
cognitive control in response to context (Zabelina & Robinson, 2010). However, further work is 
needed to determine if training individuals to flexibly modulate cognitive control could improve 
their creativity.  
Another mechanism that has been suggested to enable shifting between modes involves 
differentially adjusting the focus of attention based on the demands of the task at hand (Gabora, 
2003; Vartanian, Martindale & Matthews, 2009). There may be a link between the mechanism 
responsible for adjustments in cognitive control and the mechanism responsible for adjusting 
attentional focus. For instance, Kaufman (2011) suggests that, during generative thinking, 
unconscious cognitive processes activated through defocused attention are more prevalent, 
whereas, during exploratory thinking, controlled cognition activated by focused attention 
becomes more prevalent. There is evidence that creative individuals are better able to alter this 
focus of attention in response to task demands by modulating cognitive inhibition (Ansburg & 
Hill, 2003; Bristol & Viskontas, 2006; Dorfman, Martindale, Gassimova & Vartanian, 2008; 
Gabora, 2000, 2003; Vartanian, Martindale & Kwiatkowski, 2007). In addition, shifting between 
these processes may be more effectively applied by creative individuals over the course of a 
creative task (Gilhooly, Fiortou, Anthony & Wynn, 2007; Vartanian, Martindale & 
Kwiatkowski, 2003). However, there is debate about whether shifting happens automatically or 
under top-down control (Vartanian, Martindale & Matthews, 2009), which would appear to hold 
implications for efforts to train this mechanism. If it is under top-down control then explicit 
instructions could be used to stimulate less creative individuals to better adjust their focus of 
attention, but if it occurs automatically then some means of implicitly inducing shifts in 
attentional focus may be required. It may be the case, as Vartanian, Martindale & Matthews 
(2009) suggest, that both top-down and automatic bottom-up processes can drive adjustments in 
the focus of attention, and that whether this mechanism is under conscious control, or not, is a 
function of the stage of the task that one is engaged in. Dual-process accounts of ‘non-creative’ 
cognition have suggested that a third level of processing, termed the reflective mind, might 
initiate the shift between Type 1 and Type 2 processes (Stanovich, 2009). These Dual-process 
theories could inform attempts to understand what appears at to be a mechanism that controls 
shifting between the two modes and hence could play a role in attempts to stimulate shifting.  
New section heading? Moving to a neurobiological level of explanation, one potential 
candidate for a shifting mechanism is the ‘salience network’ proposed by Menon & Uddin 
(2010). The salience network incorporates the Anterior Insula and the Anterior Cingulate Cortex, 
which has been shown to become active shortly before an insightful solution is reached (Kounios 
& Beeman, 2009) consistent with it playing a role in the shift from unconscious generative 
processing to conscious validation. Menon & Uddin (2010) propose that this network serves to 
shift between a Default Mode Network (DMN) and a Central Executive Network (CEN; see also 
Raichle, MacLeod, Snyder, Powers, Gusnard & Shulman, 2001; Fox, Snyder, Vincent, Corbetta, 
Van Essen & Raichle, 2005). They summarise evidence that the DMN shows decreases in 
activity during cognitively demanding tasks and includes brain regions involved in self-
referential and social-cognitive processing, and in processing episodic and autobiographical 
memory. It has been further suggested that this retrieval of information from memory, both 
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personal and general may facilitate solving problems and developing future plans (Greicius, 
Krasnow, Reiss & Menon, 2003). Thus, the function of the DMN might appear to bear some 
relationship to the associative processes involved in the generation of creative ideas (see 
Buckner, Andrews-Hanna & Schacter, 2008). Conversely, CEN activity increases during 
cognitively demanding tasks and has been linked to maintaining and manipulating information in 
working memory and making judgements and decisions. Thus, the CEN may play a role in the 
analysis and evaluation of creative ideas and Type 2 thinking processes. Further, the CEN is 
closely aligned anatomically and functionally with a reflective C network proposed by 
Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert, and Trope (2002; see also Lieberman, Jarcho & Satpute, 2004) whilst 
the DMN shares some overlap in brain regions with a reflexive, X network proposed by 
Lieberman et al. (2002; 2004). However, the latter are not perfectly aligned anatomically and 
whether they are functionally aligned is not yet clear in the literature. The X-network is linked 
with associative learning that occurs without conscious intention and with intuition-based self-
knowledge (Lieberman et al., 2002, 2004), which bears some relation to conceptions of the 
DMN. However, whereas episodic memory retrieval is seen as part of the DMN it is seen as a 
key aspect of the C network by Lieberman et al. (2004). Further illustrating the complexity of the 
relationship between generative and evaluative thinking, and the underlying brain mechanisms, a 
recent fMRI study by Ellamil, Dobson, Beeman & Krisstoff (2012) found that the default mode 
network and the central executive network were both activated during evaluation of creative 
ideas but not during creative generation. The latter was associated with activation of the medial 
temporal lobes, which supports memory retrieval during creative generation. 
Clearly there is much to be worked out in the mapping between brain networks, the 
processes of creative thinking and dual process models of cognition.  However, the consistent 
involvement of the ACC in shifting suggests that ACC activation could be a useful marker to 
identify shifting as participants work on creative problems. This could afford us a way to 
compare the timing and frequency of shifting between more and less creative problems solvers 
and solutions. 
 
Developing chronometric approaches to explore the time course of shifting 
Methods for training creativity have tended to focus on just one component such as 
divergent thinking (Scott, Leritz & Mumford, 2004). However, given the evidence that creativity 
involves an interaction between divergent and convergent thinking (Basadur, 1995; Finke, 1996; 
Gabora & Ranjan, 2013; Howard-Jones 2002; Nijstad et al., 2010), attempts to stimulate the 
shifting and interaction between these modes could be more effective.  
Stimulating shifting between different modes of thinking to aid creativity could involve 
enhancing the means by which one shifts, the ability to shift, or the time course of shifting. An 
individual who is proficient at rapidly shifting between modes may not know when to shift. For 
instance, the finding that presenting examples during a generative phase can have detrimental 
effects (Jansson & Smith, 1991) suggests that a mismatch between the phase of the creative 
process and the mode of thinking can negatively affect creative output (Howard-Jones, 2002). 
Further, rapid cycling between modes of thinking may result in ideas being prematurely 
evaluated leading to promising ideas being dismissed (Nijstad, et al., 2010; Zabelina & Beeman, 
2013), whereas an individual who has a good understanding of when is the optimal time to shift 
might be better at allowing time for an idea to be sufficiently worked out before applying 
evaluative processes.  
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The possibility that patterns of shifting differ across stages of the creative process 
(Basadur, 1995) suggests that the relationship between creativity and shifting is an important 
avenue for further research. Factors such as frequency of shifts, the length of operating in one 
mode before a shift, and differences in patterns or the nature of shifting at different stages could 
be examined. Experimental studies using think-aloud protocols (Gilhooly et al., 2007) in 
combination with neuroimaging methods such as EEG (Martindale & Hasenfus, 1978; Fink & 
Benedek, in press) open up the possibility of using chronometric approaches to explore the time 
course of shifting during creative thinking. By using them conjointly it may be possible to lock 
events in the creative process to patterns of neural activity exhibited by an individual while they 
are engaged in a creative act. This approach could be used to inform instruction to people of 
when it is optimal to shift in order to maximise creative output. 
Finally, individual differences in trait dispositions to engage in different modes or styles 
of thinking have also been proposed (Basadur et al. 1982; Basadur, 1995; Epstein, 2003; 
Kaufman, 2011; Norris & Epstein, 2011; Stanovich, 1999). Chronometric approaches would 
allow us to compare whether these trait differences affect the timing of the shifting process. 
Differences in the tendency to engage in a certain mode of thinking could have implications for 
the design of interventions to stimulate shifting.  For example, Howard-Jones (2002) argues that 
individuals evidencing a disposition to think more analytically may benefit from interventions 
which focus on enabling them to shift to a more associative mode of thinking while those 
evidencing a disposition to think more imaginatively may benefit from interventions that enable 
them to shift to a more self-critical, analytical style of thinking (Howard-Jones, 2002).  Further 
researche is necessary to examine if trait differences interact with the process of shifting between 
modes of thinking. 
Summary and Conclusions 
There appears to be consensus amongst different dual-process models of creativity on the 
importance of generative and evaluative processes and on the importance of the interaction 
between these modes during creative thinking. However different models appear to conceptualise 
this in different ways. The time seems ripe to develop an integrated dual-process model of 
creativity that clearly specifies the nature of this interaction across different points in the creative 
process and the mechanisms that underlie shifting between modes. An important part of this 
process will be to make use of the findings from the wider body of dual-process theories of 
cognition. By understanding the relationship between Type 1 and Type 2 thinking processes on 
the one hand and the processes of generation and evaluation, as conceived in different models of 
creativity, on the other, we may be better able to elaborate our understanding of the creative 
thinking process and its underlying biological mechanisms. This should help us to develop new 
methods of intervening to enhance creative thinking. In future studies it would be useful to 
investigate (1) the extent to which shifts in ideation-evaluation ratios can be achieved, and (2) 
whether creativity is enhanced by the ability to shift along the continuum as a function of the 
circumstances and the stage of the creative process. One particularly promising avenue is the use 
of a chronometric approach to explore patterns of shifting between modes whilst thinking 
creatively. 
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Table 1. Comparison of the characteristics of Type 1 and Type 2 processes with dual process 
models of creative thought. For instance, the table shows that Type 1 processes may contribute to 
both convergent and divergent thinking in Guilford’s (1956) Structure of Intellect model and that 
Type 2 processes contribute to both generation and exploration of ideas in Finke et al.’s (1992) 
Genoplore model. 
 Dual process models of cognition (Evans, 2008; Frankish, 
2010) 
 
 
 
Dual process model of 
creativity 
Type 1 processes (rapid, 
unconscious, automatic, 
intuitive, associative, 
unlimited capacity, contextual, 
reflexive) 
Type 2 processes (slow, 
controlled, effortful, 
conscious, analytic, capacity 
limited, rule based, reflective) 
Cognitive Experiential Self 
Theory (Epstein, 2003) 
Experiential (divergent) 
thinking 
 
Structure of Intellect 
(Guilford, 1956) 
Divergent thinking 
Convergent thinking 
Divergent thinking 
Convergent thinking  
Ideation – Evaluation cycles 
(Basadur et al., 1982; 
Basadur, 1985) 
Mapping unclear Mapping unclear 
Blind Variation and Selective 
Retention (Campbell, 1960; 
Simonton, 2011) 
Variation (but context effects 
excluded) 
Selection 
Genoplore (Finke et al., 1992) Generation Exploration 
Generation 
Dual State Model (Howard-
Jones, 2002) 
Generative Analytical 
Honing Theory (Gabora, 
2005) 
Associative Analytic 
Dual Pathway Model (Nijstad 
et al., 2010) 
 Flexibility 
Persistence 
 
